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11/URIDICAL" MEANS ARISING BY OPERATION OF LAW, as distinguished
J from that which arises by agreement or act of the parties.
"Law" as defined by St. Thomas Aquinas - a definition which has
persevered - is an ordinance of reason, promulgated by a duly consti-
tuted authority, intended for the common good.
"Machinery" will be understood as the agencies whose functions relate
to the establishment or maintenance of world order.
"World order" will be regarded as world-wide ordered peace between
states.
Strictly speaking, therefore, one may well argue that there is no
available legal machinery for a juridical world order in that there is no
agency or institution with legislative, executive or judicial competency -
as we understand those terms. Certainly, there is no such agency with
supra-national, international or per-national authority (to coin a phrase),
to restrict the scope of national or state sovereignty of any major power.
Insofar as effective sanction may be the criterion of the rule of law -
the governmental authority to prevent wrongful activities and to punish
their perpetration - as urged by Austin - there is, at present, no such
authority.
Insofar as effective moral sanction may be the criterion - the authority
of the natural, moral law and the obligations imposed thereby, as urged
by St. Thomas Aquinas and the Scholastics - there is, at present, no
general or effective recognition of any such authority.
While the people in control of the governments of many states are
theistic in their religion and believe in and try to live by the principles
of the natural, moral law, nevertheless, approximately one-half of the
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population of the world lives under Com-
munist rule and its atheistic principles.
Denying God, the Communists repudiate
the existence of any such moral law and
guide their state solely by the precept of
what they think best for it at any particular
time. Morality, as we understand it, plays
no part in their human relations either be-
tween individuals or states.
Not to end this paper with that state-
ment, let us examine the international agen-
cies that do exist. These, by amendment or
other grant of greater competency, may
become legal agencies in a juridical world
order.
First in order is the World Court of
Justice.
The World Court was "established by
the Charter of the United Nations"1 and
functions "in accordance with the provi-
sions of the present Statute," i.e., the stat-
ute or agreement organizing the Court,2 to
which all members of the United Nations
are parties. Its members are elected by the
General Assembly and Security Council of
the United Nations. 3
States only may be parties to litigation
in the World Court4 and no competency by
way of criminal jurisdiction over human
individuals is vested in it.5
Its jurisdiction comprises "all cases which
the parties refer to it and all matters spe-
cially provided for in the Charter of the
United Nations or in treaties and conven-
tions in force."' , Such jurisdiction of "cases"
1 U. N. CHARTER art. 14.
2 U. N. CHARTER art. 1.
3 U. N. CHARTER arts. 3-10.
4 Ibid.
5 U. N. CHARTER arts. 34, 35.
6 U. N. CHARTER art. 36.
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is not compulsory but voluntary. No state
can compel another to respond to a com-
plaint filed in that Court. However, states
which are "parties" to the present Statute
may at any time declare that they recognize
as compulsory ipso facto and without spe-
cial agreement, in relation to any other
state accepting the same obligation, the
jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes
concerning the interpretation of treaties,,
any question of international law, the exis-
tence of breaches of international obliga-
tions and reparations therefor. 7
Various states, for a period of years and
upon conditions, have accepted this compul-
sory jurisdiction. Among them the United
States accepted it on August 14, 1946, but
upon conditions, one of which is the Con-
nally Reservation. This reservation provides
that the declaration of acceptance shall not
apply to "disputes with regard to matters
which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of the United States of America
as determined by the United States of
America .. ."I Since August 14, 1946,
various other states have attached the pro-
visions of the Connally Reservation to their
acceptance. 9
The effect of this provision is to make
the acceptance almost a nullity because the
reserving state upon its mere "ipse dixit"
can preclude the Court from taking juris-
diction.
It has another effect. It impliedly accords
to any other state which is a party to a
given dispute the same right as is reserved
to the reserving state.
The Court, as an adjunct or judicial
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petency to try issues which are within
the domestic jurisdiction of any state.
The United Nations Charter provides that
"Nothing contained in the present Charter
shall authorize the United Nations to inter-
vene in matters which are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of any state or
shall require members to submit such mat-
ters to settlement under the present Char-
ter."1 o
The Statute of the Court provides that
"In the event of a dispute as to whether
the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall
be settled by the decision of the Court."'
The result is that the Court is an institu-
tion with no jurisdiction over international
disputes unless conferred by the parties to
the dispute. But, assuming that such juris-
diction is conferred, there is no provision
in the Statute or the Charter which pro-
vides effective execution or implementation
of its adjudications or decrees.
The Charter provides that each member
"undertakes to comply with the decisions"
of the Court "in any case to which it is a
party." But, in the event of a failure to
perform obligations under "a judgment
rendered by the Court," the prevailing
party "may have recourse to the Security
Council, which may, if it deems necessary,
make recommendations or decide upon
measures to be taken to give effect to the
judgment."' 2 This function of the Security
Council concerns a matter '"other than pro-
cedural" and is subject to the veto under
Article 27, Section 3.
Far from constituting a piece of cur-
rently available legal machinery for a jurid-
ical world order is concerned, it may well
10 U. N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
11 U. N. CHARTER art. 36, para. 6.
12 U. N. CHARTER art. 94.
be argued that the World Court is or may
be made a nullity. However, by abandon-
ment of such reservations as the Connally
Reservation, and amendment of the Court's
Statute and of the United Nations Charter
the Court may become a most effective
judicial arm of a juridical world order.
As such, the Court would take prece-
dence over the United Nations and the
organs thereof primarily concerned with
the maintenance of international peace and
national as well as international security
- the Security Council and the General
Assembly. The UN's other organs, such
as the Economic and Social Council, the
Trusteeship Council and the Secretariat, are
but ancillary in character.
The Security Council consists of eleven
members, five permanent (Nationalist
China, France, United Kingdom, U.S.,
U.S.S.R.) and six elected by the General
Assembly.' 3 It is charged with "primary
responsibility for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security."'1 4 It is author-
ized to call upon disputant states to settle
their disputes which threaten such peace
and security "by negotiation, enquiry, me-
diation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial
settlement ... or other peaceful means."' 15
It may investigate any such -disputes to
determine whether they threaten such peace
and security. 16
It may determine that a threat to inter-
national peace, or a breach thereof or an
act of aggression has occurred and recom-
mend or decide what steps should be taken
by the members of the United Nations by
way of economic sanctions, interruption of
means of communications and severance of
13 U. N. CHARTER art. 23.
14 U. N. CHARTER art. 24.
15 U. N. CHARTER art. 33.
16 U. N. CHARTER art. 35.
diplomatic relations or military, naval or
air operations in the nature of "demon-
strations, blockade, and other operations."'"
The Security Council, however, is re-
stricted in its competency by reason of the
Charter provision that on all matters other
than procedural - which are decided by
an affirmative vote of any seven members
-the decision shall be made "by an affirma-
tive vote of seven members including the
concurring votes of the permanent mem-
bers."'8 A negative vote or veto by a perma-
nent member bars any such action. Such a
vote has been cast on some eighty occa-
sions.
This veto restriction also applies to the
question of whether the matter under dis-
cussion is procedural or other than pro-
cedural - a double veto.
The Security Council, therefore, cannot
always or ever be relied upon to solve any
disputes between major powers or their
allies or satellites where their vital interest
or national honor is thought to be at stake.
A veto of a permanent member will prevent
any unwanted suggested solution being
adopted.
The Security Council has no charter
competency to legislate and bind the mem-
bers of the United Nations or their people
thereby. It is not made competent, over a
veto, to adjudicate disputes between states
or, over a veto, to enforce any such adjudi-
cation. It has no conferred competency to
restrict in any way the absolute sovereignty
of any state or the acts of any state in the
exercise thereof over the veto of any per-
manent member.
The General Assembly consists of all
member states or nations. 10 Its functions
17 U. N. CHARTER arts. 39, 41, 42.
18 U. N. CHARTER art. 27.
19 U. N. CHARTER art. 9.
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include discussion of any matters within
the scope of the Charter, consideration of
such matters and recommendation to its
members on any such matters.20
The General Assembly makes its deci-
sions "on important questions" by a ma-
jority vote of two-thirds of the members
"present and voting."121
The "Uniting for Peace" resolution,
adopted by the General Assembly in. No-
vember, 1950, does not increase its com-
petency under the Charter. It does not and
cannot constitute an amendment to the
Charter. 22 This resolution, which followed
the outbreak of the Korean war, provided
for setting up within the General Assembly
a Collective Measures Committee of four-
teen members to study and report on pos-
sible means of strengthening international
peace and security under the Charter.
While the veto power of any one member
does not apply to voting in the General
Assembly, the competency of the General
Assembly to affect its members is limited
to recommendation. It cannot compel ac-
tion by them. It has no legislative compe-
tency as we understand legislation. It has
no effective executive or judicial authority.
These recommendations may be adopted
or rejected by the member states. That is
wholly within their discretion and volition.
The fact that a member has voted in favor
of a recommendation does not mean that
the member is estopped to reject it there-
after, as was evidenced in the recommen-
dations relating to the invasion of Korea as
voted on by the People's Republic of China.
In the exercise of its functions to initiate
studies to promote "international coopera-
20 U. N. CHARTER art. 11.
21 U. N. CHARTER art. 18.
22 U. N. CHARTER arts. 108, 109.
LEGAL MACHINERY FOR A WORLD ORDER
tion in the political field" and to encourage
"the progressive development of interna-
tional law and its codification," and to ini-
tiate similar studies in the economic, social,
cultural, educational and health fields and
to assist "in the realization of human rights
and fundamental freedoms," much has been
accomplished and is being achieved. How-
ever, as the "political field" and that of
"human rights" more directly relate to our
subject, they only will be discussed.
The General Assembly established an In-
ternational Law Commission in 1947 which
has produced numerous reports suggesting
interpretation and codification of principles
of international law, none of which have
yet been adopted by-the Assembly or ap-
proved by the member states. In some mat-
ters such as the definition of "aggression,"
the members of the Commission have not
been able to agree.
The General Assembly on December 10,
1948, without a dissenting vote, adopted
and proclaimed the "Universal Declaration
of Human Rights," as a "common standard
of achievement for all peoples and all na-
tions, to the end that every individual and
every organ of society, keeping this Decla-
ration constantly in mind, shall strive by
teaching and education to promote respect
for these rights and freedoms and by pro-
gressive measures, national and interna-
tional, to secure their universal and effec-
tive recognition and observance .... "23
This Declaration contains negative provi-
sions - denying governmental authority in
certain areas - and positive provisions -
asserting governmental obligation to act in
others.
It does not constitute an enforceable Bill
of Rights against any state or the United
23 U. N. CHARTER (preamble).
Nations.24 It does not have the force of the
Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the
United States. 25
In addition the General Assembly has
pending before it a "Draft Covenant of
Civil and Political Rights." This Draft
Covenant provides that "if it is adopted by
the General Assembly and in turn sub-
mitted by it to the member states and
approved by any of its member states then
such states as accept it 'agree' upon the
provisions thereof." Its preamble sets forth
among other inducements, the considera-
tion of "the obligation of States under the
Charter of the United Nations to promote
universal respect for, and observation of,
human rights and freedoms. '26
This Draft Covenant is limited to Civil
and Political Rights, not only of individual
human beings but of peoples gathered in
natiofhal units as well. It asserts the right
of self-determination of such peoples. It
asserts the rights of the individual against
his state in various areas. It likewise asserts
the rights of the family as a unit of society
against the state. It provides for a "Human
Rights Committee" to which complaints
may be referred by one party to the cove-
nant against another party thereto for vio-
lation of its provisions. The Committee
may "ascertain the facts" and make avail-
able its good offices to effect a friendly solu-
tion of the matter, and, in addition, shall
report the facts to the disputant parties and
to the Secretary General of the United
Nations for publication. It may recommend
that the Economic and Social Council re-
quest an advisory opinion from the World
Court upon the matter.
24 Ibid.
25 U. S. CoNST. amends. I-X.
26 Draft Covenant of Civil and Political Rights.
The Draft Covenant further provides
that if the dispute is not otherwise solved,
the parties may bring the case before the
World Court.
There is also pending before the General
Assembly a "Draft Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights." This likewise
contemplates an agreement between mem-
ber states which become parties to it after
it has been adopted by the General Assem-
bly and referred to the member states. This
Covenant asserts, among other rights, the
right of self-determination of peoples, the
rights of individuals to work, to receive
adequate pay therefor, to decent living for
themselves and families, to rest, reasonable
limitation of working hours, to adequate
food, clothing and housing, adequate stand-
ards of living, education, of protection for
motherhood, children and family, and the
health thereof.
In addition, the General Assembly has
been considering a proposed "Declaration
upon the Rights of the Child," which will
probably take the same course as the "Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights."
There is no authority vested in the United
Nations to compel any of its member states
to enforce any Declaration of Human
Rights. There is no such authority as is
discussed hereinbefore, to compel compli-
ance with any Multilateral Covenant of
Human Rights if the General Assembly
should adopt any such Covenant. There is
no effective sanction inherent in the United
Nations to prevent or to punish violations
of any such Declaration or Covenant. Com-
pliance depends upon the good faith of the
particular states involved.
The Specialized Agencies which articu-
late with the United Nations through its
General Assembly and Economic and So-
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cial Council 27 are ancillary in character to
the principal organs of the United Nations
and its primary purpose of maintaining in-
ternational peace and security. Some of
them antedate the United Nations Charter
and even the League of Nations Covenant,
such as the International Telecommunica-
tion Union (1865), the Universal Postal
Union (1874), and the International Labor
Organization (1919). The others postdate
the Charter - the Food and Agriculture
Organization, the International Bank and
the International Monetary Fund (1945),
UNESCO (1946), the International Civil
Aviation Organization (1947), the World
Health Organization (1948) and the World
Meteorological Organization (1950).
The Collective Defense Pacts are not in-
cluded in this discussion for two reasons.
They came into existence because of the
uncertainty if not the inability of the United
Nations to provide a collective security.
While they may relate in part to other mat-
ters, they are primarily intended for collec-
tive self-defense against aggression and are
theoretically temporary in character in that
they only operate "until the Security Coun-
cil (United Nations) has taken the mea-
sures necessary to maintain international
peace and security. 28
Among such treaties are the Brussels
Treaty (1948), covering the Benelux States
plus France and the United Kingdom, the
International Treaty of Reciprocal Assis-
tance (1947-48), OAS - the Organization
of American States, the North Atlantic
Treaty-NATO (1949), the South East Asia
Treaty - SEATO (1954), the ANZUS
Pact (1952), covering Australia, New Zea-
land and the United States, the Baghdad
27 U. N. CHARTER arts. 57, 63, 64.
28 U. N. CHARTER art. 51.
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Pact-METO (1955), covering three Near
East or Mid-East States and the United
Kingdom, and the Warsaw Pact (1955),
signed by the Soviet Union and its Eastern
European satellites.
No space is given here to the Western
European political organizations which are
much closer to an organic integration of
states into a federation than anything exist-
ing elsewhere. The scope of their activities
is limited to Western Europe and do not
now measure up to the standard of legal
machinery for a juridical world order.
Among such organizations are the Euro-
pean Community for Coal and Steel (1952),
which includes France, West Germany and
Italy; Euro-market (1957), establishing a
common market for the same states plus
the Benelux States; Euratom (1957), es-
tablishing among the same states an atomic
energy pool; the European Common Mar-
ket (1957), including the same states; and
the Council of Europe (1949), which in-
cludes the same states as above plus Den-
mark, Greece, Ireland, Norway, Sweden,
Turkey, and the United Kingdom.
The outstanding agency or organization
making any effective effort toward the es-
tablishment of a juridical order is the
United Nations. As stated by Goodrich and
Simons in their study of The United Na-
tions and the Maintenance of International
Peace and Security, "The United Nations
has not imposed a new order of law and
justice, but it has provided a framework of
established organs and procedures for sub-
jecting international conduct to a judgment
based on defined purposes and principles. '2 9
The UN Charter, if it may properly be
called legal machinery, establishes, in the
provisions for its amendment,3 0 a way and
a means of equipping it with limited but
adequate supra-national, trans-national, or
per-national competency to prevent or to
punish aggression by any state, to maintain
peace, and to provide effective national
security.
29 GOODRICH & SIMONS, THE UNITED NATIONS
AND THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE
AND SECURITY 65 (1955).
30 U. N. CHARTER arts. 108, 109.
